BACKGROUND OF SHIP AND VOYAGE DETAILS

The 72,708 gt car carrier, built in 1996, had a length of 264.6m and was sailing under the flag of the United States. The ship was in ballast condition and had moored starboard side along on 9 March 2021, with the stern ramp deployed on the quayside. The mooring configuration initially consisted of four head lines, four stern lines, and two spring lines forward and aft.  On 11 May 2021, gale force winds of Beaufort (Bf) Scale 7–8 with heavy squalls (Bf 10) were encountered from a west-south-westerly direction. During this period of adverse weather, the ship was successfully held in position utilising tugs.

SUMMARY OF THE INCIDENT

On the day of the incident, the forecasted wind was south-westerly, Bf 5–6, later increasing to westerly, Bf 7–8. In view of the forecast, the Master had one additional line added forward and aft. The anchor was made ready for emergency deployment, and a request was made for a tug to be kept on standby.

At 0924 the master went to the bridge due to the worsening conditions. At 0930, tug assistance was requested, and two deck officers were instructed to inspect the lines. At 0945, before the requested tugs had arrived, mooring lines parted consecutively as the wind gusted to Bf 10 (50 kts). When the lines parted, the master ordered the starboard anchor to be dropped, the main engine to be started, and the vehicle ramp raised. The master then activated the emergency alarm, initiated the contingency plan, and notified the Port Authority.

The head lines parted first, followed by the failure of a shore bollard cover with a spring line attached. The ship began drifting in a north-easterly direction towards the adjacent dockyard, around 120 m away on the opposite side of the waterway. Eight minutes after all lines parted, two tugs arrived. Despite their efforts, the ship’s bulbous bow struck two floating pontoons at the dockyard, before the drifting ship contacted a floating dock within the dockyard and became trapped against it and the dockyard quay

At 0953, a tug was ready to push from the port side aft, and the anchor was weighed. At 1000, an additional tug made fast at the bow, and at 1014, another tug assisted amidships from the port side. A pilot boarded at 1015.

The ship was manoeuvred back to the original berth but attempts to moor with replacement lines were unsuccessful. At 1324, with the assistance of another pilot and a fourth tug, re-berthing was achieved at a more protected berth.

The ships port side shell plating was cracked, and its bulbous bow was holed. On the berth where the ship was originally moored the concrete facing, a mooring bollard, a roller fender, and a lifebuoy bracket were damaged. Whilst in the nearby dockyard, two floating pontoons suffered minor damage, and a fender was torn from the quay and sank. The dockyard’s floating dock also sustained damage, including bending and deformation of the deck edges.

The subsequent casualty investigation identified the following findings:

An independent consultancy was employed to determine the condition of the mooring lines at the time of the incident and the consequences for the ship. Their expert report revealed that only one stern line was in good condition, while 12 of the 14 deployed mooring lines were found to be inadequate. The investigation showed that the mooring lines would have been unlikely to fail if they had been in new condition.

Line failure incidents have not been uncommon at the Bremerhaven port, with one major event reported in 2023. In response to these events, the port authority has acquired berth analysis software to assess the parameters of existing berths and to monitor those in use.

Had a tug arrived in time, it could have been used to keep the ship alongside.

BSAFE INCIDENT CASE STUDY NO.28 – SUMMARY, BRITANNIA COMMENTARY AND REFLECTIVE LEARNING FORM