



# Weekly Report

01/04/26



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
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## About Africa Risk Compliance

Headquartered in Exeter and London, UK and with branch offices in Lomé, Togo, Cotonou, Benin and Lagos and Port Harcourt, Nigeria, Africa Risk Compliance Limited (ARC) was established to bring together a team of Africa and maritime security experts to address challenges faced by those operating in Africa. With roots in the security sector, our key service offering is the management and arrangement of security in the complex jurisdictions of the nations around the Gulf of Guinea.

In 2021, ARC expanded its service offering to provide a management service to arrange embarked armed guards in the Indian Ocean, and since 2021, risk management services to counter the threat of drug smuggling on merchant vessels, and journey management and on-shore vehicle services in Nigeria.

# Black Sea



## Current Threat Levels

### Black Sea

Drones: **MEDIUM**

Missiles: **MEDIUM**

Mines: **HIGH**

Electronic Interference: **HIGH**

### Sea of Azov

Drones: **MEDIUM**

Missiles: **MEDIUM**

Mines: **HIGH**

Electronic Interference: **HIGH**

## Security Incidents

Since start of 2026	13
Since start of 2025	32
Since February 2022	82

## Incidents Involving Sea Mines

Since start of 2026	0
Since start of 2025	9
Since February 2022	43

## Reports 26 March – 1 April 2026

**25 March 2026. UUV Attack. 11nm off Turkey.** A tanker was hit by an unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) whilst underway off Turkey. The incident caused damage to the engine room and the bridge. The crew was reported safe. The vessel had reportedly loaded crude oil at the Russian Port of Novorossiysk prior to the incident.

## Maritime Threats

Since the start of this conflict in February 2022, we have recorded more than 70 maritime security incidents in the Black Sea involving merchant vessels. These incidents include missile attacks, drone attacks, and vessel detentions. The recent pattern of attacks indicate that both Ukraine and Russia have been focused on targeting energy infrastructure, with many strikes targeting facilities at or near ports. Vessels have suffered collateral damage in several of these attacks. Vessels sailing off the coasts of Russia and Ukraine have also been directly targeted in recent incidents.

Sea mines have also been a threat to vessels in the Black Sea. Russian forces planted hundreds of sea mines in Ukrainian waters. Many of these mines have since become untethered and drifted, posing a risk to merchant vessels across the Black Sea and to civilians along the coast. Since the start of the war, we have recorded more than 30 incidents involving sea mines, with the majority occurring outside Ukraine. Reports of sea mines have been made as far as Romania. Vessels in the Black Sea should remain vigilant, avoid floating objects, maintain lookouts, and monitor local navigation warnings. Any suspicious objects observed in the region should be reported with photo and video evidence if possible.

The Black Sea remains unpredictable and is high-risk area for all vessels. Crew are advised to operate



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at MARSEC Level 3 when operating in the Black Sea and ensure they are prepared to respond to any potential threats or emergencies. This is particularly important for calls to any Russian or Ukrainian ports, as circumstances can change quickly and without warning. The threat of collateral damage in ports in Ukraine and Russia is particularly high, as port cities continue to be key targets in this conflict. For Ukrainian ports, the risk is higher at night as Russian forces typically carry out attacks under cover of darkness.

# Arabian Gulf Region



## Current Threat Levels

### Conflict

Arabian Gulf: **CRITICAL**

Gulf of Oman: **CRITICAL**

Gulf of Aden: **HIGH**

Red Sea: **HIGH**

## Reports 26 March – 1 April 2026

**30 March 2026. Kinetic Attack. 30nm NE of Dammam, Saudi Arabia.** A vessel reported two projectile objects landing in close proximity, each landing within one hour of each other. The incident occurred whilst the vessel was underway in the Arabian Gulf. The crew were reported safe, and the vessel did not sustain any damage.

**30 March 2026. Kinetic Attack. 27nm NW of Dubai, UAE.** An unconfirmed projectile object reportedly hit a tanker on the starboard side, causing a fire on board. The crew was reported safe and no environmental impact was reported.

**31 March 2026. Kinetic Attack. 117nm N of Doha, Qatar.** A tanker was hit by two unconfirmed projectile object on the port side. One caused a fire, which has been extinguished. The second is reportedly unexploded within the vessel's engine room. Authorities are investigating.

## Maritime Threats

### US-Israel Conflict with Iran

On 28 February 2026, the US and Israel launched coordinated attacks against Iran. The strikes came after inconclusive indirect talks between the US and Iran days prior. In response, Iran has carried out a series of retaliatory strikes across the region. Several Gulf states have reported attacks targeting strategic areas within their respective territories. Targets have included bases used by American forces, energy infrastructure, and port facilities. Though many projectile weapons have been intercepted by regional air defence systems, the attacks have caused damage and casualties across the Gulf.

The event has had spillover effects in the maritime space, with commercial vessels sustaining material damage and casualties among crew members. **Vessels are advised to avoid transit in the Arabian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman, and the Northern Arabian Sea. Spillover events are expected in the Red Sea region, and this area should also be avoided.**



## Kinetic Activity

ARC has now recorded 32 incidents involving vessels and kinetic weapons in the Gulf of Oman, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Arabian Gulf during this conflict. These incidents include:

- Vessels directly hit by missiles or drones
- Collateral damage of vessels caused by debris from intercepted weapons
- Unexploded ordinance landing on vessels
- Kinetic weapons landing in the water near vessels

These events have resulted in damage to vessels and casualties among seafarers. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have claimed responsibility for several confirmed attacks targeting merchant vessels, stating that the vessels were linked to the US. However, not all the vessels targeted to date have had explicit links to the US or Israel, suggesting that all vessels are vulnerable to attack. The IRGC has also claimed responsibility for at least three attacks for which there is no evidence they took place. This is likely to create confusion, reiterate Iran's threats to shipping, and remind the industry of their blockade on the Strait of Hormuz.

Ports and energy facilities have also been targeted in Iran's retaliatory attacks. Logistic and energy infrastructure remain key targets for Iranian forces, and these attacks are likely to continue throughout the conflict. Ports in the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman are particularly exposed to attack, but attacks reported at Duqm and Salalah in Oman indicate that Oman's ports in the Northern Arabian Sea are also vulnerable. So far in the conflict, the UAE's ports have been targeted more than any others in the region.

## The Strait of Hormuz

Shortly after fighting broke out on 28 February 2026, vessels reported receiving VHF transmissions from an entity identifying itself as the Iranian Navy warning against transiting through the Strait of Hormuz. Days later, an IRGC commander announced that the Strait was closed to commercial vessel traffic. The commander stated that any vessels attempting to transit through the Strait would be attacked. The IRGC have asserted that they have full control of the Strait, and these warnings are the most explicit they have issued after years of threats that the Strait would be closed in retaliation for any attacks against Iran.

Comments referencing the closure of the Strait do not constitute a formal and legal declaration that the Strait has been closed, but there have since been six incidents in which vessels have been targeted whilst transiting through the Strait. The threat should therefore be taken seriously, and the vital waterway is not safe for vessel traffic. This is regardless of whether vessels transit with AIS switched on or off.

AIS data continues to show that vessel traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has decreased dramatically. Thousands of vessels remain stranded in the Arabian Gulf, and hundreds of vessels that previously intended to enter the Arabian Gulf via the Strait are also stranded in the Gulf of Oman. This has caused a considerable amount of congestion near some ports in the region.

## Electronic Interference

Electronic interference is continuing to affect navigational instruments in the Arabian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf of Oman, though the number of reported incidents has decreased over the last week. The issue has affected hundreds of vessels in the region since the conflict started.



Electronic interference causes disruption to GPS, AIS, and other PNT systems lasting for several hours. The issue is common in conflict zones and is typically an attempt either to disrupt military equipment that relies on GPS or to tamper with a vessel's navigation systems to divert it of course. The issue has been a long-standing problem in the region as a result of elevated tensions. Merchant vessels are not usually the direct target of electronic interference but are typically indirectly affected by efforts to compromise military equipment.

### **Houthi Attacks in the Red Sea**

On 28 March 2026, the Houthis officially entered the US-Israel-Iran conflict with a ballistic missile attack targeting Israel. This development, and the numerous threats against shipping issued by the militant group in recent weeks, has prompted concerns of a resumption in hostilities against vessels in the Red Sea region. There is no evidence to suggest that the Houthis have targeted any vessels since the conflict started in late February, and it is currently unclear when or whether the Houthis will start targeting merchant vessels again. However, the threat is still considered elevated as the militant group has expressed a willingness to carry out attacks and retains the capability to do so. The Houthis have not specified a target profile for any future attacks as they have in previous campaigns against shipping, but it is highly likely that vessels with US and Israeli links will be targeted once again. Still, the threat of attack applies to all vessels in the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb, and the Gulf of Aden given the Houthis' track record of attacking vessels based on incorrect or outdated information.


### **Threats to Shipping**

Due to the active conflict and the spillover effects in the maritime space, ***the threat to vessels in the Arabian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman, and the Northern Arabian Sea is assessed to be critical.*** This area has been included in the Joint War Committee's Listed Areas due to the high threat level. Transit through this region is not recommended, as kinetic activity is inevitable as the conflict continues. Vessels in the Gulf region are highly vulnerable to direct hits and collateral damage as a result of drone and missile strikes, and collisions due to crowding near major ports and anchorages. Due to ongoing issues with electronic interference, vessels are advised to monitor all electronic navigational aids and use non-electronic means of position fixing as a backup. Any suspicious activity or incidents should be reported immediately.

***The threat in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden is assessed to be high as attacks by the Houthis can happen at any time.*** Transit through this region should also be avoided, and vessels in the area may also be affected by electronic interference.



# Somalia-Based Piracy



## Current Threat Levels

### Piracy

Red Sea: **LOW**

IRTC: **LOW**

Arabian Sea: **MEDIUM**

Indian Ocean: **MEDIUM**

## Reports 26 March – 1 April 2026

Nothing to report.

## Maritime Threats

***The risk of piracy is currently assessed as moderate in the Indian Ocean. The risk is higher in the waters closer to the coast of Somalia. Following the recently reported pirate activity in the region, vessels are advised to transit at least 600nm from the coast of Somalia. It is also advised that vessels exercise caution in then region, maintain a heightened security posture, and report any suspicious activity.***

Pirate groups have demonstrated a clear intention to carry out attacks against merchant vessels over the last year. In 2024 and the early months of 2025, evidence of ongoing pirate activity was reported after pirate groups hijacked several dhows along the coast of Somalia between Eyl and Xaafun. Many of these dhows remained under pirate control to be used as motherships to deploy skiffs in attacks against merchant vessels. There have been no recent reports of incidents affecting merchant vessels. However, piracy remains a concern in the region due to ongoing pirate activity, wth reports of a fishing vessel being hijacked in late March 2026. The threat is further heightened by the presence of foreign fishing vessels in Somalia waters.

Pirate groups that operate off Somalia are known to hijack fishing vessels during disputes with international fishing fleets or as part of opportunistic attacks for resource theft. Pirates are known to use these motherships to locate larger vessels to target, either by using the fishing vessel's AIS or by sailing through regular vessel traffic. Once a target has been identified, the perpetrators deploy skiffs to carry out an attack. Attacks typically involve the perpetrators firing at the targeted vessel and attempting to overpower the crew. Vessels that are successfully hijacked are typically held in Somali territorial waters. Pirate groups are usually armed with AK-47s and/or rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs); however, their primary intention is to intimidate the crew in order to seize control of the vessel and later demand ransom in exchange for the crew's release.



# Yemeni Ports and HRA Floating Armoury Updates

## Yemeni Ports status' as of 1 April 2026


Gulf of Aden Ports	Status	Red Sea Ports	Status
Ash Shihr	Temporarily closed	Mokha	Closed
Mukalla	Operational	Hodiedah	Operational
Nishtun	Operational	Saleef	Operational
Balhaf	Closed	Ras Isa (shore tanks)	Operational
Rudhum	Temporarily closed	Ras Isa (SPM)	Operational
Aden	Operational		



## HRA Floating Armoury Updates

MV ANTARCTIC DREAM has relocated to RVP (10° 42.0' N, 065° 09.0' E).

Due to the increased risk associated with transit through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, most platforms and PMSCs have requested that clients inform them of any Israeli links to their vessels.






# Drug Smuggling from Latin America

## Drug Smuggling Incidents from Ports in Latin America from 2025


Argentina		Colombia		Guatemala	
San Lorenzo	1	Cartagena	4	Puerto Quetzal	1
Unspecified	2	Buenaventura	3	Unspecified	2
<b>Brazil</b>		<b>Costa Rica</b>		<b>Mexico</b>	
Paranaguá	20	Limón	7	Unspecified	1
Santos	15	Puerto Caldera	1	<b>Nicaragua</b>	
Rio de Janeiro	1	Unspecified	3	Unspecified	1
Itapoa	4	<b>Ecuador</b>		<b>Panama</b>	
Pecem	2	Guayaquil	20	Colón	2
Salvador	2	Posorja	9	Balboa	4
Natal	1	Puerto Bolívar	2	Cristobal Anch	2
Villa do Conde	1	Unspecified	22	Panama City	1
Mucuripe	1	<b>Dominican Republic</b>		Unspecified	10
Porto da Madeira	1	Santo Domingo	2	<b>Peru</b>	
Itajaí	1	Haina	1	Paita	3
Fortaleza	1	Caucedo	1	Unspecified	5
Unspecified	20	Unspecified	2	<b>Uruguay</b>	
<b>Chile</b>				Montevideo	2
Arica	1				
San Vicente	1				
Unspecified	3				

Unidentified South American Ports: 83

### Vessels Implicated in Drug Smuggling




### Popular Hiding Spots on Board



N.B. Figures are based on current information at time of publication of this report, and may change over time as further information on previous incidents is received. The figures represent the number of incidents of drug smuggling/trafficking on merchant vessels from ports in Latin America to ports globally.



# Lagos, Nigeria



## Current Threat Levels

**Theft, Robbery, and Stowaways**  
STS and NPA Anchorage: **HIGH**  
Port Area: **HIGH**

**Piracy & Kidnap for Ransom**  
STS and NPA Anchorage: **MEDIUM**  
Port Area: **LOW**

## Reports 26 March – 1 April 2026

Nothing to report.

## Maritime Threats

Lagos has consistently seen a high number of stowaway incidents on vessels in anchorage and at berth. There have been an increasing number of incidents involving stowaways using small craft to follow vessels and board via the rudder when at anchorage after a vessel has left berth. All vessels should carry out stowaway searches prior to departure and watch for small boats around the rear of the vessel following departure from port.


There has been a recent increase in theft and robbery incidents at Lagos Port. If spotted by crew and alarm raised, thieves and robbers will usually flee without altercation or threat to crew. Terminals inside the port have poor security infrastructure, so vessels at berth are easy targets for thieves, robbers and stowaways. It is recommended that vessels maintain a vigilant watch, especially at night and dawn and dusk when visibility is poor. Ships should also stow and lock away any tools, ropes and valuables on deck.

## Last Incident

**15 March 2025. Theft (Successful). Lagos Port, Nigeria.** A bulk carrier was boarded by sea robbers whilst berthed at Eko Terminal. The perpetrators boarded by the river side and stole paint cans before escaping on a local canoe. Crew was reported safe.



# Offshore and Niger Delta, Nigeria



## Current Threat Levels

- Delta Creeks and Rivers: **HIGH**
- Bonny River: **HIGH**
- Escravos/Forcados: **HIGH**
- Calabar River: **HIGH**
- Offshore Brass: **HIGH**
- Offshore Bonny: **HIGH**
- Deep Offshore Bonny: **HIGH**
- Deep Offshore Lagos: **HIGH**

## Reports 26 March – 1 April 2026

Nothing to report.

## Maritime Threats

Despite a significant reduction in piracy incidents off Nigeria, reports of pirate activity and recent incidents in indicate that the threat level across Nigeria’s EEZ is still considered high. Pirate attacks have demonstrated that the pirates have an excellent understanding of the geographical limits of security escorts and local Naval forces, and they have the ability to board vessels sailing at good speed using light-weight aluminium ladders. There remains a significant threat to all vessels up to 250nm from the coast of Nigeria. Merchant vessels avoiding Nigerian waters should remain extremely vigilant as pirates have shown themselves capable of operating at significant distances from the shore, including outside of Nigerian waters.


There is also a threat of piracy in the Bonny River area, as several kidnapping incidents have been reported over the past year. Though passenger vessels have been the primary targets in these attacks, the incidents point to an increase in insecurity that could affect merchant vessels.

## Last Incident

**8 March 2026. Hijack. Ibaka/Calabar Channel, Nigeria.** The Nigerian Navy reported that suspected pirates intercepted and hijacked a passenger vessel in transit from Ibaka, Akwa Ibom to Bakassi, Cameroon. The pirates had held the passengers hostage with the intention of kidnapping them. The Nigerian Navy intervened and rescued the hostages. The suspects fled into the creeks.



# Benin and Togo



## Current Threat Levels

### Theft, Robbery & Stowaway

Lomé: **MEDIUM**

Cotonou: **MEDIUM**

### Piracy & Kidnap for Ransom

Lomé: **MEDIUM**

Offshore Togo: **HIGH**

Cotonou: **MEDIUM**

Offshore Benin: **HIGH**

## Reports 26 March – 1 April 2026

Nothing to report.

## Maritime Threats

There remains a high threat in the waters offshore Benin and Togo, where vessels often drift awaiting berthing instructions, or carry out STS bunker operations. Recent pirate activity suggests that pirate group operations may be moving further west, and therefore the threat in these waters has increased. The threat area deep offshore Benin should be considered particularly elevated, as there are minimal options for security services or effective response in the event of an incident offshore. Vessels should move further south and west to avoid this area, or move straight into anchorages where there is a greater Navy presence and maritime security services available.

## Last Incident

**21 October 2025. Suspicious Approach. 33nm S of Cotonou, Benin.** A tanker was reportedly approached by a small craft. There were no weapons or equipment seen on the craft, which was described as a wooden boat. Three individuals on board wearing casual clothing and lifejackets reportedly spoke in an aggressive manner and in English over VHF. The crew carried out security procedures and maintained continuous lookout for two hours. The Master carried out evasive manoeuvres and sent an alert. A Benin Navy vessel was dispatched to provide assistance, and the small craft sailed away once the naval vessel arrived. The vessel was in transit from Warri, Nigeria to Lomé, Togo at the time of the incident. Details suggest that the individuals on board the small craft may have been local fishermen and not perpetrators attempting to carry out an attack.



# Western Gulf of Guinea



## Current Threat Levels

Senegal: **LOW**

Guinea: **LOW**

Sierra Leone: **LOW**

Liberia: **LOW**

Côte d'Ivoire: **MEDIUM**

Ghana: **MEDIUM**

## Reports 26 March – 1 April 2026

Nothing to report.

## Maritime Threats

There is an elevated risk of theft, robbery and stowaways at all ports in West Africa. Guinea in particular has a history of violent robbery incidents. Ghana's Takoradi port has a consistent record of security incidents at anchorage, with robbers and thieves targeting vessels for opportunistic theft of valuable items. Most flee once an alarm has been raised and they are aware they have been spotted by the crew. All incidents should be reported to local authorities. The piracy risk in this area of the Gulf of Guinea is assessed to be medium, with a relatively higher threat in the eastern half of Ghana due to its closer proximity to piracy hotspots in the region.


There have historically been a number of security incidents against local fishing vessels in this area. Local reporting and type of attacks suggest either fishing disputes or the involvement of drug smuggling gangs, with some vessels involved in these attacks previously being detained for drug smuggling.

## Last Incident

**21 March 2026. Armed Robbery (Successful). Abidjan Anchorage, Côte d'Ivoire.** Four perpetrators armed with knives reportedly boarded a supply vessel whilst in anchorage. An alarm was raised once the perpetrators were seen on board. The perpetrators escaped after stealing a fast rescue craft and some paint cans. The crew were reported safe.



# Cameroon to Gabon



## Current Threat Levels

### Theft, Robbery & Stowaway

Cameroon: **MEDIUM**

Eq Guinea: **LOW**

Sao Tome & Principe: **LOW**

Gabon: **MEDIUM**

### Piracy & Kidnap for Ransom

Cameroon: **HIGH**

Eq Guinea: **HIGH**

Sao Tome & Principe: **HIGH**

Gabon: **HIGH**

## Reports 26 March – 1 April 2026

Nothing to report.

## Maritime Threats


There is a high risk of piracy attack and kidnap in the waters of countries outside of Nigeria, especially Cameroon, São Tomé and Príncipe, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. Several incidents have been reported in these waters over the last year, indicating that the hotspot for piracy in the region has shifted south of Nigeria. In recent attacks, pirates have demonstrated their reach outside of the EEZ. Such attacks have occurred at a great distance from Naval resources and commercial security services, meaning that pirates are able to stay on board or longer periods of time to carry out attacks. Vessels should avoid "no-mans-land" areas, such as the waters south of Bioko Island, where security is very thin and there is a lack of commercial assets.

## Last Incident

**11 January 2026. Kidnap for Ransom. 31nm NE of Port Gentil. Gabon.** A fishing vessel was boarded by at least three armed suspects. The suspects kidnapped nine of the 12 crew members on board. Following the attack, the vessel and the three remaining crew members were escorted to the port of Libreville by a Gabonese naval vessel.



# Congo to Angola



## Current Threat Levels

**Theft, Robbery & Stowaway**  
Rep of Congo: **MEDIUM**  
DR of Congo: **MEDIUM**  
Angola: **HIGH**

**Piracy & Kidnap for Ransom**  
Rep of Congo: **MEDIUM**  
DR of Congo: **MEDIUM**  
Angola: **MEDIUM**

## Reports 26 March – 1 April 2026

Nothing to report.

## Maritime Threats

There is a medium threat of piracy in this region. Niger Delta-based pirates have demonstrated the capability to operate at significant distances offshore, though there have not been any piracy incidents recently reported in this area. Small product and bunker tankers should be extra vigilant, as they provide relatively low freeboard, cargo that is attractive for the black market, and crew to kidnap. These vessels also often spend a significant amount of time in the region, possibly allowing pirate group networks to collect intelligence in preparation for future attacks.

Thefts and robberies remain a consistent threat at anchorages in the region. Angola’s ports in Luanda and Soyo have seen some of the highest numbers of theft incidents in the region in the last year.

## Last Incident

**5 February 2026. Theft (Unsuccessful). 50nm W of Cabinda, Angola.** An FPSO off Cabinda reported one intruder attempted to board by climbing a mooring chain. The individual was not armed and was trying to board from a local fishing boat with five fishermen on board. Crew spotted the intruder before he could board, and he jumped into the water to flee.



# Recent History and Trends - Gulf of Guinea

## Number of incidents in the last six months:

Angola	5
Benin	1
Cameroon	1
Côte d'Ivoire	3
DRC	1
Equatorial Guinea	2
Gabon	1
Ghana	5
Nigeria	10

## Terminals & Anchorages with the most incidents in last six months:

Takoradi Anchorage	4
Lagos Port	5
Luanda Anchorage	4
Abidjan Anchorage	3
Lagos Anchorage	2
Ikungulu Anchorage	1

## Stowaway Statistics – Number of Incidents (based on IMO and local reports)

	Last 3 months	Last 6 months	Last 12 months
Abidjan	1	1	2
Dakar	0	1	3
Douala	3	4	4
Freetown	0	0	2
Lagos	1	6	16
Limbe	0	0	1
Lomé	0	1	2
Onne	0	0	1
Owendo	0	1	1
Port Harcourt	2	2	3
San Pedro	1	1	1

## Gulf of Guinea Security Incidents

Incidents this month (last 30 days)	2
Incidents since start of 2026	12
Incidents since start of 2025	64

## Crew & Passengers Kidnapped

This month (last 30 days)	0
Since start of 2026	27
Since start of 2025	140

## Incidents involving security forces and merchant vessels since start of 2021

Embarked Navy Guards	23	Success Rate of Protecting Vessel	94%
Armed Escort Vessel	8	Success Rate of Protecting Vessel	100%

## Attack success rate since 2020 (no crew kidnapped and vessel not hijacked)

Year	Total No. of Attacks	Vessel Escaped	Attack failure rate
2022	19	8	42.11%
2023	20	6	30%
2024	12	3	25%
2025	10	4	40%
2026	1	0	0%

N.B. Figures show total number of piracy attacks targeting merchant vessels (not armed robbery/theft), total number of incidents where vessel escaped (no crew kidnapped or vessel hijacked) and the resulting failure rate of pirates' attacks. Figures show rates as of publication date of this report.

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