



# WEEKLY REPORT



16/04/25

Maritime Security | Underwater Services | Operations Support | Agency Services

London | Lomé | Cotonou | Lagos | Port Harcourt



## Contents

Maritime Security Incidents and Updates	Page
Black Sea	2
HRA, Indian Ocean	4
Yemen Ports and Floating Armouries	9
Drug Smuggling from Latin America	10
Lagos, Nigeria	12
Niger Delta, Nigeria	13
Benin and Togo	14
Western Gulf of Guinea	15
Cameroon to Gabon	16
Congo to Angola	17
Gulf of Guinea Recent History & Trends	18
<b>Militancy, Community Conflict and Industrial Action in the Niger Delta</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>West Africa Shipping News</b>	<b>20</b>


## About Africa Risk Compliance

Headquartered in Exeter and London, UK and with branch offices in Lomé, Togo, Cotonou, Benin and Lagos and Port Harcourt, Nigeria, Africa Risk Compliance Limited (ARC) was established to bring together a team of Africa and maritime security experts to address challenges faced by those operating in Africa. With roots in the security sector, our key service offering is the management and arrangement of security in the complex jurisdictions of the nations around the Gulf of Guinea.

In 2021, ARC expanded its service offering to provide a management service to arrange embarked armed guards in the Indian Ocean, and since 2021, risk management services to counter the threat of drug smuggling on merchant vessels, and journey management and on-shore vehicle services in Nigeria.

Visit Us:





## Current Threat Levels

### Black Sea

Drones: MEDIUM  
Missiles: MEDIUM  
Mines: HIGH  
Electronic Interference: HIGH

### Sea of Azov

Drones: MEDIUM  
Missiles: MEDIUM  
Mines: HIGH  
Electronic Interference: HIGH

## Black Sea Security Incidents

### Security Incidents

Since start of 2025	3
Since start of 2024	12
Since February 2022	35

### Casualties and Detentions

Injuries	14
Deaths	45
Crew detained	50

### Incidents Involving Sea Mines

Since start of 2025	3
Since start of 2024	13
Since February 2022	39

### Location of Sea Mine Incidents

Ukraine	7
Romania	7
Bulgaria	3
Turkey	4
Georgia	1

## Analysis

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, we have recorded more than 30 maritime security incidents in the Black Sea involving merchant vessels. These incidents include missile attacks, drone attacks, and vessel detentions. While some merchant vessels hit by missiles or damaged during port attacks were victims of collateral damage, many have been directly targeted by Russian armed forces since the start of the war. We have recorded five incidents in which the Russian military has intercepted and detained merchant vessels suspected of involvement with Ukraine.

Over the course of the conflict, Russian forces have planted hundreds of sea mines in Ukrainian waters, many of which have since drifted, posing a risk to merchant vessels across the Black Sea and to civilians along the coast. Since the start of the war, we have recorded 23 incidents involving sea mines, with the majority occurring outside Ukraine.

On 25 March 2025, Russia and Ukraine agreed to a naval ceasefire intended to ensure safe navigation in the Black Sea. Despite their confirmed agreement, conflicting statements issued by both Russia and Ukraine suggest that the ceasefire deal remains problematic. Moscow has reportedly stated that the ceasefire would




not take effect until Western sanctions against Russia were lifted, whereas officials in Kyiv have said it would come into force immediately. Both sides have expressed doubts about the other's willingness to comply with the agreement, and Russia has recently stated that it cannot accept the ceasefire deal in its current form.

The ceasefire represents a promising step forward for the region, and the Black Sea has not been a theatre of combat in this conflict since the early days of the war. However, given the ambiguous nature of the ceasefire, ongoing disagreements between both parties on the deal, and the previous incidents affecting vessels throughout the conflict, the Black Sea remains a high-risk area for all vessels. The region continues to be highly unpredictable, and the security situation could change at any time.

Crew should operate at MARSEC Level 3 when transiting the area and ensure they are prepared to respond to any potential threats or emergencies. The threat in ports in Ukraine and Russia is particularly high, as port cities—especially those in Ukraine—have been frequent targets. Vessels in the Black Sea should remain vigilant, avoid floating objects, maintain lookouts, and monitor local navigation warnings.





## Current Threat Levels

### Piracy

Red Sea: **LOW**

IRTC: **MEDIUM**

Arabian Sea: **HIGH**

### Conflict

Persian Gulf: **HIGH**

Gulf of Oman: **HIGH**

Gulf of Aden: **HIGH**

Red Sea: **HIGH**

## Reports 10 - 16 April 2025

- **15 April 2025. Fired On. 100nm E of Aden, Yemen.** The Master of a merchant vessel reported being followed by several armed perpetrators in multiple small craft. The perpetrators reportedly fired shots during the pursuit, which lasted approximately two hours. The vessel altered course toward the Yemeni coastline and reportedly grounded to try and evade the small craft, and the small craft left the area. The crew were reported safe, and the vessel proceeded to next port of call. Authorities are investigating the incident.

## Analysis

### Somalia-Based Piracy

In November 2023, the threat of Somalia-based piracy in the region increased following a years-long pause in activity. There have since been at least 50 Somali piracy incidents reported, including the hijacking of two bulk carriers and several fishing vessels. Since the resurgence of pirate activity off the coast of Somalia, substantial ransom payments are confirmed to have been made to pirate groups for the release of three vessels and their crews. It is highly likely that ransoms have been paid for the release of other vessels since attacks resumed in the region. These payments are likely to encourage further attacks.

Many of the fishing vessels captured in the past year may have been attacked due to fishing disputes between local fishing communities and international fishing fleets or as part of opportunistic attacks for resource theft. However, several of these fishing vessels remain under pirate control and are likely being used as motherships for future attacks on larger vessels. Pirate groups are known to use these motherships to locate larger vessels to target, either by utilising the fishing vessel's AIS or by sailing through regular vessel traffic. Once a target has been identified, the perpetrators deploy skiffs to carry out an attack. Vessels that are successfully hijacked are typically held in Somali territorial waters. Pirate groups are usually armed with AK-47s and/or rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs); however, their primary intention is to intimidate the crew in order to seize control of the vessel and later demand ransom in exchange for the crew's release.

Naval sources have stated that there are several pirate camps along the eastern coast of Somalia, between the towns of Hobyo and Durdura. The town of Eyl has historically been a piracy hotspot, and it is believed that much of the current pirate activity originates from this location. There may also be pirate camps on Somalia's northern coast, between the towns of Bosaso and Qandala, making attacks in the Gulf of Aden a possibility.



Due to the pirate activity reported in recent months and the opportunistic nature of pirate attacks, ***the risk of piracy remains high for all merchant vessels transiting through the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea, and the Gulf of Aden.*** This risk is particularly elevated off Somalia, but it extends deep offshore as attacks have been reported as far as 600nm offshore. It is important to note that although most reported incidents have occurred within or near the Indian Ocean High-Risk Area (HRA), pirate groups have demonstrated the capability to carry out attacks as far as 1,000nm from the coast of Somalia.

## Iran and Wider Conflict Threats

Since 2021, Iran has seized or attempted to seize more than 20 merchant vessels. Such incidents are often followed by claims in Iranian media that the merchant vessel had committed a crime such as hitting an Iranian vessel or for fuel smuggling. When seizing vessels, Iranian forces are known to open fire and show serious disregard for the safety of crew and the environment. Iranian forces have also used airborne weapons against vessels, which is an evolution from the mines and waterborne IEDs (WBIEDs) previously used. These are still considered a threat as well.

Iran's seizure of an Israel-linked vessel on 13 April 2024 occurred amid heightened tensions in the region due to the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict and followed the suspected Israeli strike targeting the Iranian Consulate in Syria on 1 April 2024. The incident, along with the Revolutionary Guard's recent threats to close the Strait of Hormuz, suggests Iran may continue to use the maritime space within the context of its conflict with Israel. Consequently, ***there is a risk to Israel-linked vessels transiting through or calling at ports in the Gulf of Oman, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Persian Gulf.*** Vessels transiting through the Persian Gulf are advised to exercise caution and use the Northern Persian Gulf to the Strait of Hormuz Transit Corridor so that Coalition Naval Forces can assist quickly in the event of an emergency.

In the last three months, the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) engaged in a series of large-scale military exercises involving multiple branches of the armed forces. The exercises took place across Iran and in the waters of the Persian Gulf. Multilateral exercises involving the navies of Iran, Russia, and China were also carried out in the Gulf of Oman on 11 March 2025. Additional exercises are expected in the future, and commercial vessels may notice an increased security presence and may experience VHF hailing whilst sailing in the Strait of Hormuz or near Iran's territorial waters. In recent months there have also been several reports of electronic interference in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. The interference has caused disruptions to GPS, AIS, and other PNT systems lasting for several hours, forcing vessels to use backup navigation methods. Electronic interference is known to occur in conflict zones and is typically an attempt either to compromise military equipment that relies on GPS or to tamper with a vessel's navigation systems to divert it off course. This presents a serious threat to safe navigation in the region, and vessels experiencing such disruptions are advised to report the incident.

## Heightened Threat in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Bab el-Mandeb Strait

### Background

On 14 November 2023, in response to the ongoing war between Israel and Hamas, Yemen's Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi, issued a warning that his forces could make further attacks on Israel and target Israel-linked ships in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Since the announcement we have reported on more than 140 related security incidents targeting merchant vessels in the area, including suspicious approaches, calls to alter course, the hijacking of an Israel-linked commercial vessel in the Red Sea, and dozens of kinetic attacks targeting commercial vessels. Since the attacks began, at least three seafarers have been killed, and several others have been injured.



In response to the attacks, several shipping lines announced plans to reroute through South Africa's Cape of Good Hope or pause shipments through the Red Sea until further notice to protect crew and cargo. A number of security platforms also chose to increase the cost of their services significantly over the course of this conflict due to the expanded High-Risk Area, associated rise in insurance costs, and the reduced vessel traffic through the Red Sea.

International navies have been active in attempting to combat the Houthi threat in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden since early in this crisis. On 19 December 2023, the US Defence Secretary announced the establishment of Operation Prosperity Guardian, a coalition of more than 20 countries with the aim to secure the southern Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait for commercial vessels. On 19 February 2024, the EU launched a similar mission under the name Operation Aspides to protect vessels in the region. The navies of 10 EU countries have participated in the protective mandate, which is designed to accompany commercial vessels in the region, provide situational awareness, and only act in response to a threat with minimum force. In March 2025, the US Navy increased its naval presence in the Red Sea.

Since the Houthis started attacking merchant vessels, international navies have intercepted numerous kinetic weapons fired from Yemen. However, the presence of naval vessels in the region does not safeguard all merchant vessels in the region. Naval vessels are likely unable to defend against every attack or assist all targeted vessels.

## Target Profile

Following retaliatory airstrikes by US and UK forces on 11 January 2024, the Houthis announced they would expand their targets to include US and UK-linked vessels. This threat further expanded in May 2024 after the Houthis stated they would target all vessels within their reach with links to Israel, regardless of nationality or destination. On 13 June 2024, the Joint Military Information Centre (JMIC) issued a note stating that the Houthis' threat profile has evolved to include vessels that are part of a company structure with vessels that are calling at Israeli ports. This includes companies with a fleet that is group-owned, operated, or chartered that may have called at an Israeli port in the past. In November 2024, the Houthis stated that they would not consider any changes in ownership or flags of ships linked to Israel, and that vessels with any previous affiliations to Israel would still be targeted.

Since these attacks began, 25% of the vessels targeted by the Houthis have had no clear links to the target profile, and nearly 13% may have been targeted based on outdated or incorrect publicly available information. The wider target profile coupled with the instances of mistaken identity significantly increased the risk for all vessels transiting through the region.

## Location and Nature of Attacks

To date, most of the incidents reported have occurred north of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait between the Yemeni ports of Hodeidah and Mokha and in the eastern Gulf of Aden. After the Houthis expanded their target area in April 2024, two attacks were confirmed to have occurred in the Arabian Sea. The Houthis have also claimed to have targeted several vessels in the Indian Ocean and have also stated that they have attacked vessels in the Mediterranean Sea, but there is no evidence to suggest these attacks took place. It is currently assessed that Houthi attacks are less accurate for long-range attacks. However, the group's attack range is vast – Houthi missiles and drones are capable of reaching the northern Red Sea and the eastern Mediterranean Sea.

The Houthis have largely used anti-ship ballistic missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, and UAVs to carry out attacks, however several attacks by Uncrewed Surface Vehicles (USVs) were reported in 2024. One attack by a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) launched by a small craft has also been reported.



Many of the attacks in the Red Sea were preceded by a VHF call by an entity claiming to be the “Yemeni Navy” ordering the targeted vessel to change course or sail to a nearby port (likely Hodeidah). In many of these cases, the Houthis have launched kinetic weapons at the targeted vessel if the order has been disobeyed or ignored. After targeting vessels, the Houthi spokesman typically makes “official” statements on social media confirming the incident and the vessel name. These statements usually indicate that the attack was successful regardless of whether the Houthis hit the targeted vessel.

## Israel-Hamas Ceasefire and Current Threat to Vessels

After 15 months of conflict, Israel and Hamas agreed to a ceasefire deal that came into force on 19 January 2025. In response to the ceasefire, the Houthis stated that they would monitor developments around its implementation and would resume attacks in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden if the ceasefire were breached. The group later stated that they would lift “sanctions” on vessels without links to Israel, thereby implying that vessels with no affiliation to Israel would not be targeted in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

The conditions under which the Houthis suspended their attack have since changed. On 11 March 2025, after issuing a four-day ultimatum calling on Israel to lift an aid blockade on Gaza, the Houthis announced that they would resume attacks on Israeli vessels in the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb Strait, Gulf of Aden, and Arabian Sea. Four days later, the US carried out airstrikes on Houthi targets in Yemen in response to attacks on merchant vessels since November 2023 and as a warning to Iran to stop its support for the Yemen-based militant group. These strikes were the start of an ongoing major operation, and the US military has continued attacks on Houthi positions in the last few weeks. The US has stated they will continue the airstrikes until the Houthis agree to stop targeting vessels and other assets. In response to the airstrikes, the Houthis have since made numerous claims that they have targeted US naval vessels with missile and drone attacks. The US military has not confirmed that any such attacks have taken place, and there have been no reports of damage or casualties on US Navy vessels as a result of the alleged attacks by the Houthis.

These events unfolded amid increasing tensions between Israel and Hamas. The two parties faced disagreements over how to proceed with the fragile ceasefire. On 18 March 2025, Israel launched a large military operation in Gaza. Reports stated that Israeli officials sought to force Hamas to release the remaining hostages and that the IDF acted pre-emptively, believing Hamas was preparing to carry out a new attack. This military operation effectively cancelled the ceasefire between the two parties.

Due to these recent developments, ***the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb Strait, Gulf of Aden, and northern Arabian Sea are considered high risk.*** The Houthis are expected to continue attacks targeting US assets throughout the region, and it is highly likely that attacks against merchant vessels will resume imminently. This threat remains applicable to all vessels due to previous attacks during this crisis, in which vessels with no links to the Houthi target profile were attacked. ***Given that the Houthis have used UAVs, USVs, and RPGs to attack vessels, it must be noted that vessels are at risk of attack from both the air and the sea.***

Crew should take precautions before entering the area and operate at MARSEC Level 3 to ensure they are prepared to respond appropriately to any threat or emergency. It is recommended that companies conduct a full fleet and port call assessment to determine the level of threat to specific vessels and whether they may meet the criteria for targeting. Vessels are also at risk of collateral damage due to the Houthis’ attacks on US naval vessels, and it is therefore advised that vessels keep clear of US warships in the region. Given that future US airstrikes could target port infrastructure or areas close to ports in Houthi-controlled areas, vessels calling at Ras Isa terminal and the ports of Hodeidah and Saleef should remain extra vigilant due to the possibility of collateral damage.





## Use of Embarked Armed Guards

As this threat pertains to a wider geopolitical conflict and not piracy, embarked armed guards may not be able to counter all attacks by Houthi forces. If the vessel has embarked armed guards, they will be able to counter attempts to stop the vessel by a small craft and may be able to disable a USV on its approach. However, when facing overwhelming force by an aggressor such as multiple naval-style vessels, helicopters, missiles, or UAVs, the embarked team should stand down for the following reasons:

- An embarked security team will not have the capacity to ward off attacks from kinetic weapons such as missiles and UAVs.
- Any action by an armed team on board may be met with an overwhelming force, which would greatly endanger the safety of the crew.
- Attempts to engage with a boarding force may be seen as provocative and may result in poorer treatment of the armed guards and crew after the boarding force has taken control of the vessel.

# Yemeni Ports and HRA Floating Armoury Updates



## Yemeni Ports status' as of 16 April 2025


Gulf of Aden Ports	Status	Red Sea Ports	Status
Ash Shihr	Temporarily closed	Mokha	Closed
Mukalla	Operational	Hodiedah	Operational
Nishtun	Operational	Saleef	Operational
Balhaf	Closed	Ras Isa (shore tanks)	Operational
Rudhum	Temporarily closed	Ras Isa (SPM)	Operational
Aden	Operational		



## HRA Floating Armoury Updates

OTS YEOMAN has reportedly been abandoned due to mechanical difficulties.

Due to the increased risk associated with transit through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, most platforms and PMSCs have requested that clients inform them of any Israeli links to their vessels.



# Drug Smuggling from Latin America



## Drug Smuggling Incidents from Ports in Latin America from 2023

### Argentina

San Lorenzo	2
Zarate	1

### Brazil

Santos	75
Paranagua	39
Rio de Janeiro	12
Rio Grande	5
Itapoa	5
Itaguaí	4
Imbituba	3
Natal	3
Vitoria	2
Navegantes	2
Unspecified	36

### Chile

Arica	3
San Antonio	1
Unspecified	7

### Colombia

Cartagena	12
Buenaventura	11
Santa Marta	9
Barranquilla	9
Puerto Bolivar	2
Cienaga	1
Unspecified	22

### Costa Rica

Limon	4
Unspecified	14

### Ecuador

Guayaquil	32
Puerto Bolivar	4
Quito	2
Machala	1
Unspecified	75

### Dominican Republic

Caucedo	5
Santo Domingo	2
Haina	1
Unspecified	12

### Guatemala

Puerto Quetzal	2
Unspecified	2

### Guyana

Georgetown	2
------------	---

### Haiti

Unspecified	1
-------------	---

### Mexico

Lazaro Cardenas	2
Veracruz	1
Unspecified	7

### Nicaragua

Corinto	1
Unspecified	3

### Panama

Colon	2
Almirante	1
Unspecified	9

### Paraguay

Asuncion	1
Unspecified	2

### Peru

Paita	9
Callao	7
Unspecified	20

### Trinidad and Tobago

Pointe Lisas	1
Unspecified	2


### Uruguay

Montevideo	4
Unspecified	4


N.B. Figures are based on current information at time of publication of this report, and may change over time as further information on previous incidents is received. The figures represent the number of incidents of drug smuggling/trafficking on merchant vessels from ports in Latin America to ports globally.



## Vessels implicated in drug smuggling




## Areas of vessel used to hide drugs



N.B. Figures are based on current information at time of publication of this report, and may change over time as further information on previous incidents is received. The figures represent the number of incidents of drug smuggling/trafficking on merchant vessels from ports in Latin America to ports globally.





## Current Threat Levels

### Theft, Robbery & Stowaway

STS and NPA Anchorage: **HIGH**

Port Area: **HIGH**

### Piracy & Kidnap for Ransom

STS and NPA Anchorage:

**MEDIUM**

Port Area: **LOW**

## Reports 10 - 16 April 2025

Nothing to report.


## Analysis

Lagos has consistently seen a high number of stowaway incidents on vessels in anchorage and at berth. There have been an increasing number of incidents involving stowaways using small craft to follow vessels and board via the rudder when at anchorage after a vessel has left berth. All vessels should carry out stowaway searches prior to departure and watch out for small boats around the rear of the vessel following departure from port.

There remains a high risk of armed robbery and theft at all Lagos anchorages and across the port area. If spotted by crew and alarm raised, thieves and robbers will usually flee without altercation or threat to crew. Terminals inside the port have poor security infrastructure, so vessels at berth are easy targets for thieves, robbers and stowaways. It is recommended that vessels maintain a vigilant watch, especially at night and dawn and dusk, when visibility is poor. Ships should also stow and lock away any tools, ropes and valuables on deck.

## Last Incident

- **2 January 2025. Theft (Unsuccessful). Bovas Oil Terminal, Lagos, Nigeria.** A tanker was boarded by four suspects whilst at anchor at Lagos Port. The suspects escaped empty-handed once they were spotted by duty crew. The crew and vessel were reported safe, and the incident was reported to port authorities.



## Current Threat Levels

Delta Creeks and Rivers: **HIGH**

Bonny River: **HIGH**

Escravos/Forcados: **HIGH**

Calabar River: **HIGH**

Offshore Brass: **HIGH**

Offshore Bonny: **HIGH**

Deep Offshore Bonny: **HIGH**

Deep Offshore Lagos: **HIGH**

## Reports 10 - 16 April 2025

Nothing to report.


## Analysis

The threat level across the Nigeria EEZ is still considered high. The threat is particularly high in the Bonny River area, as several kidnapping incidents have been reported over the past few months. Though a majority of these incidents have targeted passenger vessels, the incidents point to an increase in insecurity that could affect merchant vessels.

Pirate attacks have demonstrated that the pirates have an excellent understanding of the geographical limits of security escorts and local Naval forces, and they have the ability to board vessels sailing at good speed using light-weight aluminium ladders. There remains a significant threat to all vessels up to 250nm from the coast of Nigeria. Merchant vessels avoiding Nigerian waters should remain extremely vigilant as pirates have shown themselves capable of operating at significant distances from the shore, including outside of Nigerian waters.

## Last Incident

- **5 April 2025. Kidnap for Ransom. Degema, Rivers State, Nigeria.** A passenger vessel was attacked by armed perpetrators on board one speed boat. Five people were reportedly kidnapped in the attack.



## Current Threat Levels

### Theft, Robbery & Stowaway

Lomé: **MEDIUM**

Cotonou: **MEDIUM**

### Piracy & Kidnap for Ransom

Lomé: **MEDIUM**

Offshore Togo: **HIGH**

Cotonou: **MEDIUM**

Offshore Benin: **HIGH**

## Reports 10 - 16 April 2025


Nothing to report.

## Analysis

There remains a high threat in the waters offshore Benin and Togo, where vessels often drift awaiting berthing instructions, or carry out STS bunker operations. The threat area deep offshore Benin should be considered particularly elevated, as there are minimal options for security services or effective response in the event of an incident offshore. Vessels should move further south and west to avoid this area, or move straight into anchorages where there is a greater Navy presence and maritime security services available.

## Last Incident

- **6 December 2024. Kidnap for Ransom. 9nm SE of Cotonou, Benin.** A fishing vessel was reportedly boarded by five pirates armed with AK-47s in Benin territorial waters. Reports indicate that the pirates boarded from a wooden boat, kidnapped the Master, and held the crew members on board for three hours. The pirates also stole items belonging to the crew. The Benin Navy reportedly dispatched a military vehicle to assist after receiving word of the incident. The vessel is currently docked at Cotonou port and authorities are investigating the kidnapping. The incident is believed to be linked to disputes in local fishing industries.



## Current Threat Levels

Senegal: **LOW**

Guinea: **MEDIUM**

Sierra Leone: **MEDIUM**

Liberia: **LOW**

Côte d'Ivoire: **MEDIUM**

Ghana: **MEDIUM**

## Reports 10 - 16 April 2025

- **14 April 2025. Theft (Unsuccessful). Monrovia Anchorage, Liberia.** A tanker reported a boarding by one suspected sea robber. An alarm was raised on board and the crew were reported safe.

## Analysis


The threat of piracy is higher in the eastern half of Ghana waters. There is an elevated risk of theft, robbery and stowaways at all ports in West Africa. Guinea in particular has a history of violent robbery incidents. Ghana's Takoradi port has a consistent record of security incidents at anchorage, with robbers and thieves targeting vessels for opportunistic theft of valuable items. Most flee once an alarm has been raised and they are aware they have been spotted by the crew. All incidents should be reported to local authorities.

There have historically been a number of security incidents against local fishing vessels in this area. Local reporting and type of attacks suggest either fishing disputes or the involvement of drug smuggling gangs, with some vessels involved in these attacks previously being detained for drug smuggling.

## Last Incident

- **8 April 2025. Theft (Unsuccessful). Abidjan Anchorage, Ivory Coast.** A small boat was sighted near a containership's starboard anchor chain whilst anchored at Abidjan Anchorage. One individual reportedly attempted to climb the anchor chain toward the forecabin. The crew sounded the general alarm once the perpetrator was noticed, the individual immediately retreated. No harm to the crew or vessel reported.





## Current Threat Levels

### Theft, Robbery & Stowaway

Cameroon: **MEDIUM**

Eq Guinea: **LOW**

Sao Tome & Principe: **LOW**

Gabon: **MEDIUM**

### Piracy & Kidnap for Ransom

Cameroon: **HIGH**

Eq Guinea: **HIGH**

Sao Tome & Principe: **HIGH**

Gabon: **HIGH**

## Reports 10 - 16 April 2025

Nothing to report.


## Analysis

There is a high risk of piracy attack and kidnap in the waters of countries outside of Nigeria, especially Cameroon, São Tomé and Príncipe, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. Several incidents have been reported in these waters in recent months, indicating that the hotspot for piracy in the region has shifted south of Nigeria. In recent attacks, pirates have demonstrated their reach outside of the EEZ and out of the reach of Naval forces and commercial security services. Vessels should avoid "no-mans-land" areas, such as the waters south of Bioko Island, where security is very thin and there is a lack of commercial assets.

Theft and robbery continue to be a threat in ports and at anchorages in this region.

## Last Incident

- **17 March 2025. Kidnap for Ransom. 100nm W of Puerto Iradier, Equatorial Guinea.** A tanker was reportedly boarded by ten armed perpetrators in São Tomé and Príncipe waters. Shots were fired on board, but no injuries were reported. Shortly after the incident was reported, the crew mustered in the citadel and the CSO lost contact with the Master. The pirates reportedly destroyed navigation equipment, cameras, and doors on board, and burned the hinges of the citadel door to gain access to the crew. Ten of the 18 crew members were subsequently abducted. After the pirates disembarked the vessel with the abducted crew members, the vessel proceeded to Libreville, Gabon for refuge.



## Current Threat Levels

### Theft, Robbery & Stowaway

Rep of Congo: **MEDIUM**

DR of Congo: **MEDIUM**

Angola: **HIGH**

### Piracy & Kidnap for Ransom

Rep of Congo: **MEDIUM**

DR of Congo: **MEDIUM**

Angola: **MEDIUM**

## Reports 10 - 16 April 2025

Nothing to report.

## Analysis

There is a medium threat of piracy in this region as Niger Delta-based pirates have demonstrated the capability to operate at significant distances offshore. Small product and bunker tankers should be extra vigilant in this area, as they provide relatively low freeboard, cargo that is attractive for the black market, and crew to kidnap. These vessels also often spend a significant amount of time in the region, possibly allowing pirate group networks to collect intelligence in preparation for future attacks.

Thefts and robberies remain a consistent threat at anchorages in the region, especially Luanda, Soyo, and Matadi.

## Last Incident

- **20 June 2024. Theft (Successful). Luanda Anchorage, Angola.** A vessel reported a robbery after ISPS duty crew noticed footprints near the hose pipe area during security rounds. A number of items from the ship's stores were reported missing. This is the sixth security incident to take place at Luanda Anchorage so far in 2024.



## Gulf of Guinea Port Security Statistics

### Number of incidents in last 6 months

Takoradi	3
Lagos	2
Abidjan	2
Luanda	1
Monrovia	1

### Terminals and Anchorages with highest number of incidents in last 6 months

Takoradi Anchorage	3
Abidjan Anchorage	2
Tincan Port, Lagos	1
Bovas Oil Terminal, Lagos	1
Luanda Anchorage	1
Monrovia Anchorage	1

## Stowaway Statistics - Number of Incidents (based on IMO and local reports)

	Last 3 months	Last 6 months	Last 12 months
Lagos	5	12	18
Dakar	0	3	6
Tema	0	1	2
Abidjan	1	3	3
Lomé	0	1	1
Buchanan	1	1	1
Freetown	0	0	2
Matadi	0	0	1

## Gulf of Guinea Piracy Statistics

### Security Incidents

This month (last 30 days)	8
Since start of 2025	15
Since start of 2024	56

### Crew & Passengers Kidnapped

This month (last 30 days)	21
Since start of 2025	37
Since start of 2024	79

## Incidents involving security forces and merchant vessels since start of 2021

Embarked Navy Guards	22	Success Rate of Protecting Vessel	94%
Armed Escort Vessel	8	Success Rate of Protecting Vessel	100%

## Attack success rate since 2020 (no crew kidnapped and vessel not hijacked)

Year	Total No. of Attacks	Vessel Escaped	Attack failure rate
2021	32	19	59.38%
2022	19	8	42.11%
2023	20	6	30%
2024	12	3	25%
2025	5	1	20%

N.B. Figures show total number of piracy attacks (not armed robbery/theft), total number of incidents where vessel escaped (no crew kidnapped or vessel hijacked) and the resulting failure rate of pirates' attacks. Figures show rates as of publication date of this report.

# Niger Delta Militancy, Community Conflict and Industrial Action



## Militant Activity

Statements & Threats

Nothing to report

Attacks

Nothing to report.

## Community Conflict

Nothing to report.

## Industrial Action

Nothing to report.

Current Militant Threat Level: **MEDIUM**

Current Community Threat Level: **MEDIUM**

Current Strike/Industrial Action Threat Level: **HIGH**





Nothing to report.



The guidance and advice in reports issued by Africa Risk Compliance Limited is based on information received from sources at the time of publication. Africa Risk Compliance limited shall not be held liable for any damages, costs or injuries that arise out of the provision of reports, and assumes no liability for the accuracy of the information provided.

Satellite imagery is sourced from Sentinel Hub.

Map imagery is sourced from Maritrace, Sentinel Hub, Google Earth and Mapnik.

This report is copyright of Africa Risk Compliance Limited © 2021. All rights reserved.

If you wish to use the information provided in this report, express written permission must be received from Africa Risk Compliance Limited and Africa Risk Compliance Limited must be identified as the source of the information.

**+44 (0) 203 151 1700**

**info@arcafrica.com**

**Africa Risk Compliance Limited**

**London | Lomé | Cotonou | Lagos | Port Harcourt**