



# WEEKLY REPORT



# ARC

## 18/09/24

Maritime Security | Underwater Services | Operations Support | Agency Services

London | Lomé | Cotonou | Lagos | Port Harcourt



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
## About Africa Risk Compliance

Headquartered in Exeter and London, UK and with branch offices in Lomé, Togo, Cotonou, Benin and Lagos and Port Harcourt, Nigeria, Africa Risk Compliance Limited (ARC) was established to bring together a team of Africa and maritime security experts to address challenges faced by those operating in Africa. With roots in the security sector, our key service offering is the management and arrangement of security in the complex jurisdictions of the nations around the Gulf of Guinea.

In 2021, ARC expanded its service offering to provide a management service to arrange embarked armed guards in the Indian Ocean, and since 2021, risk management services to counter the threat of drug smuggling on merchant vessels, and journey management and on-shore vehicle services in Nigeria.

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## Current Threat Levels

### Black Sea

Drones: **MEDIUM**

Missiles: **MEDIUM**

Mines: **HIGH**

Electronic Interference: **HIGH**

### Sea of Azov

Drones: **MEDIUM**

Missiles: **MEDIUM**

Mines: **HIGH**

Electronic Interference: **HIGH**

## Black Sea Security Incidents

### Security Incidents

|                     |    |
|---------------------|----|
| Since start of 2024 | 5  |
| Since start of 2023 | 28 |
| Since February 2022 | 30 |

### Casualties and Detentions

|               |    |
|---------------|----|
| Injuries      | 2  |
| Deaths        | 27 |
| Crew detained | 48 |

### Incidents Involving Sea Mines

|                     |    |
|---------------------|----|
| Since start of 2024 | 1  |
| Since start of 2023 | 17 |
| Since February 2022 | 22 |

### Location of Sea Mine Incidents

|          |   |
|----------|---|
| Ukraine  | 7 |
| Romania  | 7 |
| Bulgaria | 3 |
| Turkey   | 3 |
| Georgia  | 1 |


## Analysis

Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, we have recorded 30 maritime security incidents in the Black Sea involving merchant vessels. These incidents include missile attacks, drone attacks, and vessel detentions. While some of the merchant vessels that have been hit by missiles or damaged during port attacks were victims of collateral damage, many vessels have directly been targeted by Russian armed forces since the start of the war. We have recorded five incidents where the Russian military has intercepted and detained merchant vessels they suspect of involvement with Ukraine.

The Black Sea continues to be a high-risk area for all vessels. The region is highly unpredictable, and the security situation can change at any time. Crew should operate at MARSEC Level 3 when transiting through the area, and ensure they are prepared to respond to any potential threats or emergencies. The threat in ports in Ukraine and Russia is also elevated as port cities – particularly those in Ukraine – are popular targets. Vessels calling at Ukraine's ports are especially vulnerable because following Russia's withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative in July 2023, the military claimed that any vessel leaving a Ukrainian port is a legitimate target.

Over the course of the conflict, Russian forces have planted hundreds of sea mines in Ukrainian waters that have since drifted, presenting a risk to merchant vessels across the Black Sea and civilians on the coasts. We have recorded 21 incidents involving sea mines since the start of the war, with most incidents occurring outside Ukraine. Vessels in the Black Sea should remain vigilant, avoiding floating objects, maintaining lookouts, and monitoring local navigation warnings.





## Current Threat Levels

### Piracy

Red Sea: **LOW**

IRTC: **MEDIUM**

Arabian Sea: **HIGH**

### Conflict

Persian Gulf: **HIGH**

Gulf of Oman: **HIGH**

Gulf of Aden: **HIGH**

Red Sea: **HIGH**

## Reports 12 - 18 September 2024

Nothing to report.

## Analysis

### Somalia-Based Piracy

The threat of Somalia-based piracy in the region has recently increased following a years-long pause in activity, indicating that armed groups on the coast of Somalia are still willing and capable of pirate attacks. Since 22 November 2023, there have been more than 30 Somali piracy incidents reported, including the hijacking of three bulk carriers and several fishing vessels. While many of the captured fishing vessels have since been released, reports indicate that several are still under pirate control and are likely being used as motherships for future attacks. In mid-April 2024, it was announced that pirates released the MV ABDULLAH and its 23-member crew following the payment of a \$5 million ransom. The Bangladeshi-owned vessel had been hijacked a month prior off the coast of Somalia. The payment of a ransom to pirates is likely to inspire additional attacks.

Between mid-June and the end of August 2024, there was no pirate activity reported in the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea. This was likely due to the monsoon season and rough weather conditions that made it harder for pirate groups to carry out attacks. However, a suspicious approach believed to have been carried out by pirates was reported in the Gulf of Aden on 26 August 2024. Days later, three suspected pirates were arrested in Bereeda, Puntland following an operation by security forces. Four other suspects evaded arrest. This development confirms that pirates are still active along the coast and suggests that additional pirate attacks in the region are possible.

Due to the severity and the number of attacks that have taken place this year, as well as the opportunistic nature of these attacks and recent reported activity, the risk of piracy remains high for all merchant vessels transiting through the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea. This risk applies deep offshore, as attacks have been reported as far as 600nm off Somalia's coast. It is important to note that though most of the reported incidents have occurred within the Indian Ocean High-Risk Area (HRA), pirate groups have a demonstrated ability to carry out attacks as far as 1,000nm away from the coast of Somalia.



## Iran and Wider Conflict Threats

Since 2021, Iran has seized or attempted to seize more than 20 merchant vessels. Such incidents are often followed by claims in Iranian media that the merchant vessel had committed a crime such as hitting an Iranian vessel or for fuel smuggling. When seizing vessels, Iranian forces are known to open fire and show serious disregard for the safety of crew and the environment. Iranian forces have also used airborne weapons against vessels, which is an evolution from the mines and waterborne IEDs (WBIEDs) previously used. These are still considered a threat as well.

Iran's seizure of an Israel-linked vessel on 13 April 2024 occurred amid heightened tensions in the region due to the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict and followed the suspected Israeli strike targeting the Iranian Consulate in Syria on 1 April 2024. The incident, along with the Revolutionary Guard's recent threats to close the Strait of Hormuz, suggests Iran may continue to use the maritime space within the context of its conflict with Israel. Consequently, there is a risk to Israel-linked vessels transiting through or calling at ports in the Gulf of Oman, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Persian Gulf.

## Heightened Threat in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Bab el-Mandeb Strait

### Background

On 14 November 2023, in response to the ongoing war between Israel and Hamas, Yemen's Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi, issued a warning that his forces could make further attacks on Israel and target Israel-linked ships in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Since the announcement we have reported on more than 130 related security incidents targeting merchant vessels in the area, including suspicious approaches, calls to alter course, the hijacking of an Israel-linked commercial vessel in the Red Sea, and dozens of kinetic attacks targeting commercial vessels in the area. Since the attacks began, at least three seafarers have been killed and several others have been injured.

In response to the attacks, several shipping lines announced plans to reroute through South Africa's Cape of Good Hope or pause shipments through the Red Sea until further notice to protect crew and cargo. A number of security platforms have also chosen to increase the cost of their services significantly over the course of this conflict due to the expanded High-Risk Area, associated rise in insurance costs, and the reduced vessel traffic through the Red Sea.

Due to the nature of the incidents and threats that have occurred in the past 30 days, ***the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the Gulf of Aden, and the northern Arabian Sea are "high risk" and the threat is considered high to all vessels.*** Crew should take precautions prior to entering the area so that they are ready to respond appropriately to any threat and emergency and should operate at MARSEC Level 3 whilst transiting through the area. The threat in ports in the Red Sea is also elevated because they are located in the affected area and in range of Houthi missiles.

### Target Profile

Following retaliatory airstrikes by US and UK forces, the Houthis announced they would expand their targets to include US and UK-linked vessels. This threat further expanded in May 2024 after the Houthis stated they would target all vessels within their reach with links to Israel, regardless of nationality or destination. On 13 June 2024, the Joint Military Information Centre (JMIC) issued a note stating that the Houthis's threat profile has evolved to include vessels that are part of a company structure with vessels that are calling at Israeli ports.



This includes companies with a fleet that is group-owned, operated, or chartered that may have called at an Israeli port in the past. It is now recommended that companies do a full fleet and port call assessment to determine the threat for specific vessels and whether they meet the criteria to be targeted.

Since these attacks began, 26% of the vessels targeted by the Houthis have had no clear links to the target profile, and nearly 14% may have been targeted based on outdated or incorrect publicly available information. The wider target profile coupled with the instances of mistaken identity significantly increases the risk for all vessels transiting through the region.

## Location and Nature of Attacks

To date, most of the incidents reported have occurred north of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait between the ports of Hodeidah and Mokha and in the eastern Gulf of Aden. Since the Houthis expanded their target area in April 2024, two attacks have been confirmed to have occurred in the Arabian Sea. The Houthis have claimed to have targeted several other vessels in the Indian Ocean and have also stated that they have attacked vessels in the Mediterranean Sea, but there is no evidence to suggest these attacks took place.

The Houthis have largely used anti-ship ballistic missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, and UAVs to carry out attacks, however on 12 June 2024 the group successfully attacked a merchant vessel with the use of an Uncrewed Surface Vehicle (USV). Several USV sightings have since been reported in the Red Sea. An attack by a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) launched by a small craft was also reported on 8 August 2024. These incidents confirm that vessels are at risk of attack from the air and the sea.

The pattern of action from the Houthis towards targeted vessels seems to be:

- Contact a vessel by VHF ordering it to change course and sail towards a nearby port (likely Hodeidah), whilst claiming to be the “Yemeni Navy”.
- If the vessel disobeys or ignores the order, in previous incidents Houthis have then launched either a drone or a missile against the vessel.
- Such incidents are then followed by a large amount of local social media activity, resulting in an “official” statement from the Houthi spokesman confirming the incident and vessel name.

There have also been several reports alleging that Iranian naval vessels have been stationed in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to support the Houthis with intelligence and target acquisition. It has been noted that the Behshad, a vessel identified as part of the Iranian Navy, maintained a presence at the western end of the Gulf of Aden from 11 January to early April 2024. These allegations have not been confirmed, but the uptick in incidents during this time and the locations in which they have occurred suggest a possible link.

## Use of Embarked Armed Guards

As this threat pertains to a wider geopolitical conflict and not piracy, embarked armed guards may not be able to counter all attacks by Houthi forces. If the vessel has embarked armed guards, they will be able to counter attempts to stop the vessel by a small craft and may be able to disable a USV on its approach. However, when facing overwhelming force by an aggressor such as multiple naval-style vessels, helicopters, missiles, or UAVs, the embarked team should stand down for the following reasons:



- An embarked security team will not have the capacity to ward off attacks from kinetic weapons such as missiles and UAVs.
- Any action by an armed team on board may be met with an overwhelming force, which would greatly endanger the safety of the crew.
- Attempts to engage with a boarding force may be seen as provocative and may result in poorer treatment of the armed guards and crew after the boarding force has taken control of the vessel.

## International Naval Response

On 19 December 2023, the US Defence Secretary announced the establishment of Operation Prosperity Guardian, a coalition of more than 20 countries with the aim to secure the southern Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait for commercial vessels. Naval vessels are currently present in the area, but they are likely unable to defend against every attack or assist all vessels targeted by the Houthis.

On the night of 11 January 2024, US and UK naval and air forces carried out missile strikes on Houthi positions in Yemen in response to the ongoing attacks on merchant shipping and naval vessels involved in Operation Prosperity Guardian in the Red Sea. US and UK forces have since carried out three additional rounds of strikes in Yemen targeting Houthi positions.

On 19 February 2024, the EU launched Operation Aspides, a naval mission to protect commercial vessels in the Red Sea. France, Germany, Italy, Greece, and Belgium have confirmed participation in the protective mandate, which is designed to only act in response to a threat with minimum force. As part of the operation, naval vessels will accompany vessels and an airborne early warning system will be used to protect against attacks at sea.

On 16 March 2024, the Indian Navy carried out an operation against the pirates on the MV RUEN, a bulk carrier that was hijacked by Somalia-based pirates on 14 December 2023. INS Kolkata, with supporting ships and aircraft, forced the pirates onboard to surrender with no injury to crew, pirates or any members of the Indian military. During the operation, the pirates shot down an Indian Navy surveillance drone and fired at INS Kolkata. In response, INS Kolkata disabled the ship's steering system and navigational aids, forcing the vessel to stop. Following the operation, the vessel and crew were released with all safe and the vessel proceeded to India.

**To request a quote for armed guards, risk assessments or stowaway searches in the Indian Ocean, please email [commercial@arcafrica.com](mailto:commercial@arcafrica.com)**



# Yemeni Ports and HRA Floating Armoury Updates




## Yemeni Ports status' as of 18 September 2024

| Gulf of Aden Ports | Status             | Red Sea Ports         | Status      |
|--------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|-------------|
| Ash Shihr          | Temporarily closed | Mokha                 | Closed      |
| Mukalla            | Operational        | Hodiedah              | Operational |
| Nishtun            | Operational        | Saleef                | Operational |
| Balhaf             | Closed             | Ras Isa (shore tanks) | Operational |
| Rudhum             | Temporarily closed | Ras Isa (SPM)         | Operational |
| Aden               | Operational        |                       |             |



## HRA Floating Armoury Updates

Please note that MV SIAM has moved to RVP 17° 13'N, 039° 47.5'E. MV ANTARCTIC DREAM has also moved back to RVP 11° 00'N 064° 00'E. Due to the increased risk associated with transit through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, most platforms and PMSCs have requested that clients inform them of any Israeli links to their vessels.





# Drug Smuggling from Latin America





## Drug Smuggling Incidents from Ports in Latin America from 2023

|                   |    |                           |    |                            |   |
|-------------------|----|---------------------------|----|----------------------------|---|
| <b>Argentina</b>  |    | <b>Ecuador</b>            |    | <b>Panama</b>              |   |
| San Lorenzo       | 2  | Guayaquil                 | 32 | Colon                      | 2 |
| Zarate            | 1  | Puerto Bolivar            | 4  | Almirante                  | 1 |
| <b>Brazil</b>     |    | Quito                     | 2  | Unspecified                | 7 |
| Santos            | 60 | Machala                   | 1  | <b>Paraguay</b>            |   |
| Paranagua         | 23 | Unspecified               | 38 | Asuncion                   | 1 |
| Rio de Janeiro    | 12 | <b>Dominican Republic</b> |    | Unspecified                | 2 |
| Rio Grande        | 4  | Caucedo                   | 5  | <b>Peru</b>                |   |
| Itaguaí           | 3  | Santo Domingo             | 2  | Paita                      | 9 |
| Imbituba          | 3  | Haina                     | 1  | Callao                     | 6 |
| Itapoa            | 3  | Unspecified               | 8  | Unspecified                | 9 |
| Natal             | 2  | <b>Guatemala</b>          |    | <b>Trinidad and Tobago</b> |   |
| Vitoria           | 2  | Puerto Quetzal            | 2  | Pointe Lisas               | 1 |
| Navegantes        | 1  | Unspecified               | 1  | Unspecified                | 2 |
| Unspecified       | 9  | <b>Guyana</b>             |    | <b>Uruguay</b>             |   |
| <b>Chile</b>      |    | Georgetown                | 2  | Montevideo                 | 4 |
| Arica             | 3  | <b>Haiti</b>              |    |                            |   |
| San Antonio       | 1  | Unspecified               | 2  |                            |   |
| Unspecified       | 1  | <b>Mexico</b>             |    |                            |   |
| <b>Colombia</b>   |    | Lazaro Cardenas           | 2  |                            |   |
| Cartagena         | 12 | Veracruz                  | 1  |                            |   |
| Buenaventura      | 11 | Unspecified               | 4  |                            |   |
| Santa Marta       | 8  | <b>Nicaragua</b>          |    |                            |   |
| Barranquilla      | 8  | Corinto                   | 1  |                            |   |
| Puerto Bolivar    | 2  | Unspecified               | 3  |                            |   |
| Cienaga           | 1  |                           |    |                            |   |
| Unspecified       | 10 |                           |    |                            |   |
| <b>Costa Rica</b> |    |                           |    |                            |   |
| Limon             | 4  |                           |    |                            |   |
| Unspecified       | 7  |                           |    |                            |   |



N.B. Figures are based on current information at time of publication of this report, and may change over time as further information on previous incidents is received. The figures represent the number of incidents of drug smuggling/trafficking on merchant vessels from ports in Latin America to ports globally.




## Vessels implicated in drug smuggling



## Areas of vessel used to hide drugs



N.B. Figures are based on current information at time of publication of this report, and may change over time as further information on previous incidents is received. The figures represent the number of incidents of drug smuggling/trafficking on merchant vessels from ports in Latin America to ports globally.



## Current Threat Levels

**Theft, Robbery & Stowaway**  
STS and NPA Anchorage: **HIGH**  
Port Area: **HIGH**

**Piracy & Kidnap for Ransom**  
STS and NPA Anchorage:  
**MEDIUM**  
Port Area: **LOW**

## Reports 12 - 18 September 2024

Nothing to report.

## Analysis


Lagos has consistently seen a high number of stowaway incidents on vessels in anchorage and at berth. All vessels should carry out stowaway searches prior to departure and watch out for small boats around the rear of the vessel.

There remains a high risk of armed robbery and theft at all Lagos anchorages and across the port area. If spotted by crew and alarm raised, thieves and robbers will usually flee without altercation or threat to crew. Terminals inside the port have poor security infrastructure, so vessels at berth are easy targets for thieves, robbers and stowaways. It is recommended that vessels maintain a vigilant watch, especially at night and dawn and dusk, when visibility is poor. Ships should also stow and lock away any tools, ropes and valuables on deck.

## Last Incident

- **13 June 2024. Kidnap for Ransom. Lagos Waterways, Nigeria.** A passenger vessel was attacked whilst transiting between Apapa and Victoria Island on Lagos waterways. Local reports state that armed suspects attacked the vessel near Falomo Bridge. Four expats, including the managing director of Fouani Company and three employees of Fouani Nigeria Ltd, were confirmed to have been abducted. Police have not determined whether this was a random or targeted attack. The kidnappers contacted the family members of the victims and the Fouani Company to demand a ransom of \$1.5m. On the morning of 18 June, it was reported that Lagos police rescued the victims. It is not clear whether the ransom was paid to secure their release.





## Current Threat Levels

Delta Creeks and Rivers: **HIGH**

Bonny River: **HIGH**

Escravos/Forcados: **HIGH**

Calabar River: **HIGH**

Offshore Brass: **HIGH**

Offshore Bonny: **HIGH**

Deep Offshore Bonny: **HIGH**

Deep Offshore Lagos: **HIGH**

## Reports 12 - 18 September 2024

- **15 September 2024. Kidnap for Ransom. Bonny River, Rivers State, Nigeria.** Local reports state that the Nigerian Navy intercepted an attack on a passenger vessel on the Port Harcourt to Bonny sea route. Few details are available on the attack, but the Navy reportedly rescued 20 passengers from being kidnapped during the incident. According to the commander of the Nigerian Navy Forward Operation Base, pirates in the Bonny River area may be working with passenger boat operators to carry out attacks.


## Analysis

The threat level across the Nigeria EEZ is still considered high. The threat is particularly high in the Bonny River area, as several kidnapping incidents have been reported over the past few months. Though a majority of these incidents have targeted passenger vessels, the incidents point to an increase in insecurity that could affect merchant vessels.

Pirate attacks have demonstrated that the pirates have an excellent understanding of the geographical limits of security escorts and local Naval forces, and they have the ability to board vessels sailing at good speed using light-weight aluminium ladders. There remains a significant threat to all vessels up to 250nm from the coast of Nigeria. Merchant vessels avoiding Nigerian waters should remain extremely vigilant as pirates have shown themselves capable of operating at significant distances from the shore, including outside of Nigerian waters.

## Last Incident

- **2 September 2024. Kidnap for Ransom. Bonny River, Rivers State, Nigeria.** Local reports state that ten maritime workers were abducted during an attack on a passenger vessel in the Bonny River. The vessel was reportedly transiting from Bonny Island to Port Harcourt when it was intercepted by pirates near Dutch Island. The perpetrators robbed all passengers on board during the attack. The victims were reportedly released on 7 September 2024.



## Current Threat Levels

### Theft, Robbery & Stowaway

Lomé: **MEDIUM**

Cotonou: **MEDIUM**

### Piracy & Kidnap for Ransom

Lomé: **MEDIUM**

Offshore Togo: **HIGH**

Cotonou: **MEDIUM**

Offshore Benin: **HIGH**

## Reports 12 - 18 September 2024

Nothing to report.

## Analysis

There remains a high threat in the waters offshore Benin and Togo, where vessels often drift awaiting berthing instructions, or carry out STS bunker operations. The area deep offshore Benin should be considered one of the most dangerous areas in the Gulf of Guinea, as there are minimal options for security services or effective response in the event of an incident offshore. Vessels should move further south and west to avoid this area, or move straight into anchorages where there is a greater Navy presence and maritime security services available.

## Last Incident

- **3 April 2022. Illegal Boarding. 275nm S of Lomé, International Waters.** A bulk carrier sailing deep offshore in international waters was boarded by pirates armed with firearms. The crew moved to citadel after raising the alarm. The Italian Navy vessel Rizzo Luigi Rizzo (P595) arrived on scene and a Navy boarding team boarded the bulk carrier. It was confirmed that all 19 crew members reached the citadel safely. The pirates damaged navigation equipment on the bridge, but with the support from the Italian Navy the steering and propulsion systems were repaired. The vessel sailed under escort with the Italian Navy vessel towards Nigerian waters and then continued its sail to Lagos escorted by a Nigerian security vessel.



## Current Threat Levels

Senegal: **LOW**

Guinea: **MEDIUM**

Sierra Leone: **MEDIUM**

Liberia: **LOW**

Côte d'Ivoire: **MEDIUM**

Ghana: **MEDIUM**

## Reports 12 - 18 September 2024

Nothing to report.

## Analysis


The threat of piracy is higher in the eastern half of Ghana waters. There is a high risk of theft, robbery and stowaways at all ports in West Africa. Guinea in particular has a history of violent robbery incidents. Ghana's Takoradi port has a consistent record of security incidents at anchorage, with robbers and thieves targeting vessels for opportunistic theft of valuable items. Most flee once an alarm has been raised and they are aware they have been spotted by the crew. All incidents should be reported to local authorities.

There have historically been a number of security incidents against local fishing vessels in this area. Local reporting and type of attacks suggest either fishing disputes or the involvement of drug smuggling gangs, with some vessels involved in these attacks previously being detained for drug smuggling.

## Last Incident

- **13 August 2024. Theft (Successful). Abidjan Anchorage, Côte d'Ivoire.** Two sea robbers reportedly boarded an offshore supply vessel whilst the vessel was anchored at Abidjan Anchorage. The two suspects were seen on the starboard side main deck by ISPS watch and escaped shortly after an alarm was raised on board. Local authorities were informed, and a security vessel responded. It was later discovered that the padlock on the paint store was broken and some paint had been stolen. The crew were reported safe.





## Current Threat Levels

### Theft, Robbery & Stowaway

Cameroon: **MEDIUM**

Eq Guinea: **LOW**

Sao Tome & Principe: **LOW**

Gabon: **MEDIUM**

### Piracy & Kidnap for Ransom

Cameroon: **HIGH**

Eq Guinea: **HIGH**

Sao Tome & Principe: **HIGH**

Gabon: **HIGH**

## Reports 12 - 18 September 2024

Nothing to report.


## Analysis

The threat at anchorages in countries aside from Nigeria should be considered high, as pirates target alternative locations. A pirate group based in Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria is suspected to have carried out attacks in this region. Vessels should remain extremely vigilant when transiting through this area.

There remains a high risk of piracy attack and kidnap in the waters of countries outside of Nigeria, especially Cameroon, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Equatorial Guinea. In recent attacks, pirates have demonstrated their reach outside of the EEZ and out of the reach of Naval forces and commercial security services. Vessels should avoid "no-mans-land" areas, such as the waters south of Bioko Island, where security is very thin.

## Last Incident

- **3 July 2024. Attempted Boarding. Owendo Anchorage, Gabon.** Two vessels in the area reported receiving distress calls from a tanker stating that three armed suspects on board a small boat had attempted to board the vessel. Local reports say the crew retreated to the citadel and all external doors were locked. The boarding attempt failed and the suspects reportedly fled empty-handed after authorities arrived on the scene. The crew were reported safe.



## Current Threat Levels

### Theft, Robbery & Stowaway

Rep of Congo: **MEDIUM**

DR of Congo: **MEDIUM**

Angola: **HIGH**

### Piracy & Kidnap for Ransom

Rep of Congo: **MEDIUM**

DR of Congo: **MEDIUM**

Angola: **MEDIUM**

## Reports 12 - 18 September 2024

Nothing to report.

## Analysis

The threat across the region should be considered high as Niger Delta-based pirates have demonstrated the capability to operate at significant distances offshore. Small product and bunker tankers should be extra vigilant in this area, as they provide relatively low freeboard, cargo that is attractive for the black market, and crew to kidnap. These vessels also often spend a significant amount of time in the region, possibly allowing pirate group networks to collect intelligence in preparation for future attacks.

Thefts and robberies remain a consistent threat at anchorages in the region, especially Luanda, Soyo, and Matadi.

## Last Incident

- **20 June 2024. Theft (Successful). Luanda Anchorage, Angola.** A vessel reported a robbery after ISPS duty crew noticed footprints near the hose pipe area during security rounds. A number of items from the ship's stores were reported missing. This is the sixth security incident to take place at Luanda Anchorage so far in 2024.



## Gulf of Guinea Port Security Statistics

### Number of incidents in last 6 months

|          |   |
|----------|---|
| Lagos    | 1 |
| Luanda   | 2 |
| Owendo   | 1 |
| Conakry  | 1 |
| Takoradi | 1 |
| Banana   | 1 |
| Abidjan  | 1 |

### Terminals and Anchorages with highest number of incidents in last 6 months

|                    |   |
|--------------------|---|
| Luanda Anchorage   | 2 |
| Tincan Port, Lagos | 1 |
| Banana Port        | 1 |
| Conakry Port       | 1 |
| Takoradi Anchorage | 1 |
| Owendo Anchorage   | 1 |
| Abidjan Anchorage  | 1 |

## Stowaway Statistics - Number of Incidents (based on IMO and local reports)

|               | Last 3 months | Last 6 months | Last 12 months |
|---------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|
| Lagos         | 2             | 4             | 19             |
| Port Harcourt | 0             | 0             | 1              |
| Lomé          | 0             | 0             | 1              |
| Cotonou       | 0             | 0             | 1              |
| Dakar         | 2             | 2             | 2              |
| Matadi        | 1             | 1             | 1              |
| San Pedro     | 0             | 0             | 1              |
| Banjul        | 0             | 1             | 1              |
| Tema          | 0             | 1             | 1              |
| Freetown      | 0             | 1             | 1              |

## Gulf of Guinea Piracy Statistics

### Security Incidents

|                           |    |
|---------------------------|----|
| This month (last 30 days) | 4  |
| Since start of 2024       | 33 |
| Since start of 2023       | 75 |

### Crew & Passengers Kidnapped

|                           |    |
|---------------------------|----|
| This month (last 30 days) | 17 |
| Since start of 2024       | 41 |
| Since start of 2023       | 85 |

## Incidents involving security forces and merchant vessels since start of 2021

|                      |    |                                   |      |
|----------------------|----|-----------------------------------|------|
| Embarked Navy Guards | 22 | Success Rate of Protecting Vessel | 94%  |
| Armed Escort Vessel  | 8  | Success Rate of Protecting Vessel | 100% |

## Attack success rate since 2020 (no crew kidnapped and vessel not hijacked)

| Year | Total No. of Attacks | Vessel Escaped | Attack failure rate |
|------|----------------------|----------------|---------------------|
| 2020 | 80                   | 54             | 67.5%               |
| 2021 | 32                   | 19             | 59.38%              |
| 2022 | 19                   | 8              | 42.11%              |
| 2023 | 20                   | 6              | 30%                 |
| 2024 | 4                    | 0              | 0%                  |

N.B. Figures show total number of piracy attacks (not armed robbery/theft), total number of incidents where vessel escaped (no crew kidnapped or vessel hijacked) and the resulting failure rate of pirates' attacks. 2023 figures show rates as of publication date of this report.



# Niger Delta Militancy, Community Conflict and Industrial Action



## Militant Activity

### Statements & Threats

Nothing to report.

### Attacks

Nothing to report.

## Community Conflict

There is a high level of cult- and gang-related violence in Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta states. This includes kidnapping, violence between rival gangs and vigilante actions by cults and community groups. Local military and law enforcement actions do not always improve the situation.

## Industrial Action

Nothing to report

**Current Militant Threat Level: MEDIUM**

**Current Community Threat Level: MEDIUM**

**Current Strike/Industrial Action Threat Level: HIGH**

# West Africa Shipping News



Nothing to report.



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